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Abstract
An analysis of the Japanese credit market in 2004 between banks and quoted firms is
done in this paper using the tools of the networks theory. It can be pointed out that: (i)
a backbone of the credit channel emerges, where some links play a crucial role; (ii) big
banks privilege long-term contracts; the “minimal spanning trees” (iii) disclose a highly
hierarchical backbone, where the central positions are occupied by the largest banks, and
emphasize (iv) a strong geographical characterization, while (v) the clusters of firms do not
have specific common properties. Moreover, (vi) while larger firms have multiple lending in
large, (vii) the demand for credit (long vs. short term debt and multi-credit lines) of firms
with similar sizes is very heterogeneous.
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I. Introduction
Debt-credit relationships between firms and banks have a long history in economics (Schum-
peter, 1911). It has been widely recognized since Debreu (1959) that integrating money in
the theory of value represented by the General Equilibrium model is problematic at best. No
economic agent can individually decide to monetize alone; monetary trade should be the equilib-
rium outcome of market interactions among optimizing agents. The use of money — a common
medium of exchange and a store of value — implies that one party to a transaction gives up
something valuable (for instance, his endowment or production) for something inherently useless
(a fiduciary token for which he has no immediate use) in the hope of advantageously re-trading
it in the future. Since credit makes sense only if agents can sign contracts in which one side
promises future delivery of goods or services to the other side, markets for debt in equilibrium
are meaningless. A non-mainstream approach to cope with the financial stability based on the
understanding of debt-credit relationships between heterogeneous interacting agents is strongly
required.
This point of heterogeneity is linked to the existence of some underlying autocatalytic process
at a lower level of the system. An autocatalytic process is a dynamic process in which the growth
of a quantity is to some extent self-perpetuating, as in the case when it is proportional to its
initial value. The existence of an autocatalytic process implies that looking at the average,
or most probable, behavior of the constituent units is non-representative of the dynamics of
the system: “autocatalyticity insures that the behavior of the entire system is dominated by
the elements with the highest auto-catalytic growth rate rather than by the typical or average
element” (Solomon, 2007). In the presence of autocatalytic processes, even a small amount of
individual heterogeneity invalidates any description of the behavior of the system in terms of
its “average” element: the real world is controlled as much by the tails of distributions as by
means or averages. We need to free ourselves from average thinking (Anderson (1997) in the
context of statistical physics; Brock (1999) in that of economics; see also Mantegna and Stanley
(2000)).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the structure and heterogeneity of debt-credit
relationships by applying the recently developed tools of network analysis to an empirical data
of Japanese debt-credit network to a nation-wide scale. This investigation is quite relevant to
financial stability issues; for instance, the failure of a firm heavily indebted with a bank may
produce important consequences on the balance sheet, or the financial status, of the bank itself.
If a bank’s supply of credit is depleted, total supply of loans is negatively affected and/or the
rate of interest increases, thus transferring the adverse shock to the other firms. Therefore, the
study of structure of the links and their weights allows to gain some insights in the financial
stability of the economic system and to develop new economic policy tools.
Let us first briefly review the literature mainly based on traditional methodologies. The
exploration of the structure of credit relationships among banks and firms recently acquired
increasing importance. The availability of new and large data sets allowed researchers to analyze
the number of credit relationships between firms and banks in different years and countries (see
Diamond, 1984, Ongena and Smith, 2000, for example). These studies show that, except for a
few cases of very cash-rich firms, internal financing is only limited; short-term and long-term
loans play a crucial role in the investment expenditure of the economic system in most developed
countries.
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An important aspect is the empirical analysis on the single vs. multiple banks-firms credit
relationships (Agarwal and Elston, 2001; Farinha and Santos, 2002; and Ogawa et al., 2007)
that are based on cross-country comparisons. One can observe the presence of two paradigmatic
examples and many intermediate cases, i.e. the bank oriented example of Germany, Italy and
Japan (e.g. less than 3% of Italian firms have single bank relationships), characterized by a close
firm-bank relationship, and the market oriented paradigm of the Anglo-Saxon system (e.g., in
the UK, 25% of firms maintain only one bank relationship). Other countries, such as the EU
ones, are in the middle range between these two cases.
In institution-oriented countries, quite often a single firm may be influenced by the so-called
inside bank. In these cases, the inside bank has a more favorable access to information about
the actual financial condition of a particular firm. In the literature, a firm is defined as bank
influenced when a particular bank owns more than 50% of the firm’s share or if the chair of the
supervisory board is a banker (Agarwal and Elston, 2001). Even in Germany and Japan, where
the main bank often plays a dominant role, firms subscribe loans contracts with other banks.
Moreover, Sterken and Tokutsu (2002) states that the presence of a credit line with a main
bank attracts more loans from other banks, signaling an asymmetric information problem.
Indeed, the theory of the optimal number of bank relationships gave gave a number of
advantages and disadvantages in the choice of single and/or multiple relationships. On the
firm side, a single bank relationship comes from the minimization of costs in transactions and
monitoring, while the firm could benefit in a competing market of banks; this implies a growth
in the number of relationships. Multiple banks lending guarantees the firm against the risk of
liquidation. On the bank side, financing firms with multiple bank relationships allows to pool
the risk of failure of firms. Single linkages, on the other hand, would give the bank greater
control on the financial choices of the firm.
Moreover the tendency to multiple or single relationships changes in time, varying with
internal and external conditions. There is evidences that some firms start with a single rela-
tionship and after some time they switch to multiple links in conditions of growth opportunities
(Farinha and Santos, 2002). In particular conditions of financial distress, an evolution of the
structure of the lending relationships can be observed: for instance, in Japan, during the bubble
period, firms tended to rely on a single relationship (Ogawa et al., 2007).
Now let us turn our attention to the Japanese system of banks-firms credit relationships.
In the presence of keiretsu, a terminology for industrial corporate groups, firms have a strong
and long-lasting relationship with the so-called main bank (see Aoki and Patrick (1994) for a
review). The firm is particularly dependent on the main bank for financing because of the
information advantage over other potential lenders; this is particularly evident in conditions of
financial turbulence (Spiegel and Yamori, 2003). Bank-influenced firms should enjoy increased
access to capital through easier access to bank debt or preferential terms on loans, but on the
other hand there may be some negative effects. Close relationships allow banks to have a major
role in the corporate governance structure, like the representation of the bank on the firm’s
supervisory board. Banks that handle the majority of new equity issues of the firm often place
them among their customers, but on the other hand, they can influence the financial decisions
of firms: in fact, in the case of firm distress, they can force firms to issue equity to pay bank
debt.
The Japanese system is characterized by the presence of different types of banks: long-term
credit banks, trust banks, city banks, regional banks, secondary regional banks and insurance
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companies. In particular long-term credit banks do not have affiliation with corporate groups
and in-house credit analysis; trust banks have long-term credit to designed sectors and supple-
ment city banks. In Japanese development after the Second World War, long-term credit banks
played a crucial role because the financing of firms by issuing bonds had been strictly regu-
lated (only after 1985 a few big firms were able to issue bonds). Institution-oriented markets
have been extensively investigated. While in Germany banks-influenced firms do benefit from
increased access to capital (but there is no evidence to support the hypothesis of either prof-
itability or growth) and the payment of interest rate to debt ratio is higher for them (Agarwal
and Elston, 2001), in Japan, banks influence firms to decide about low-risk investment decisions
(lower debt-equity ratio) and bank-related firms are less profitable than other ones (Ogawa et
al., 2007). Ogawa et al. (2007) carried out a detailed analysis of dependency of the number of
long-term credit relationships on the characteristics of the firm; they emphasized that, while
the largest firms have the largest number of banks relationships, the number of relationships
is strongly positively correlated with solvability and R&D and inversely with the liquidity of
the firm. A higher profitability (ROA), debt-on-asset ratio (DAR) and lower liquidity (LAR)
lead to more banking relationships according to Sterken and Tokutsu (2002), while Kano et
al. (2006), in studying the small and medium enterprises, noticed that they benefit most from
bank-borrower relationship when they do not have audited financial statements and when they
borrow from small banks in less competitive markets.
Since 1992, the Japanese banking system has experienced a sizable deterioration in its
financial conditions (Brewer et al., 2003). Commercial banks have recorded cumulative loan
losses of about 83 trillion yen. These losses reduced the bank capitalization and led to the
failure of three large banks (and other small banks). The very poor financial conditions of those
major banks affected the whole credit system, especially those in weaker financial conditions. In
order to increase the financial stability of the system, in 1997 the Japanese regulators liquidated
a large city bank and nationalized 2 of the 3 largest long-term credit banks (Brewer et al., 2003
where it is emphasized that the banks’ failure negatively affected the stock prices of firms
that had lending relationships with the failed banks). In this paper, we analyze the bank-firm
relationships in Japan in 2004, using the network theory, where network is the set of nodes (two
types in our case: banks and firms) and links (debt/credit contracts between them).
There are some recent investigations of the “inter-bank market” (Iori et al., 2007; Boss et
al., 2004), but to the best of our knowledge only a few studies of the financial credit market (see
De Masi and Gallegati (2007) and Fujiwara et al. (2009)). The advantages of these network
analyses include (a) characterization by statistical features of a large-scale network (section IV),
(b) extraction of cohesive groups or communities in the network, and also an extensive analysis
to hierarchical structures (section V, VI), and (c) correlation of those statistical features to some
attributes of nodes/links (section VII). The point (c) here implies that the network analysis is
just a complementary methodology to those traditional ones that were briefly reviewed in the
above. The method can potentially provide scaffolding which will enable one to build a model
of the network under study and a dynamics on it, that is, financial stability issues in our case.
The paper is organized as follows: section II describes our data on the multiple lending
relationships in Japan. The definition of the credit network is explained in detail considering
several topological measures in section III, and the methodology is applied to the dataset in
order to describe the architecture of the empirical network (section IV). The following sections
are, respectively, dedicated to an analysis of the properties of the hierarchical clustering of co-
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financing banks, to an investigation of the co-financed firms by sectors and to the analysis of
possible effects of the financial conditions on the topology of credit relationships (sections V,
VI, VII). Section VIII concludes.
II. The data set
Our database is based on the survey of firms quoted in the Japanese stock-exchange markets and
on the financial statements publicly reported by each quoted firm. The data were compiled by
Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc. and commercially available. The financial statements and surveys
include the information about each firm’s borrowing from financial institutions, the amounts
of borrowing, classified into short-term and long-term borrowings. “Long-term” borrowing is
defined by scheduled repayment period exceeding one year, and “short-term” borrowing refers
to the other cases.
The financial institutions consist of long-term credit banks, city banks, regional banks (pri-
mary and secondary), trust banks and insurance companies, basically all the financial institu-
tions in Japan, which we refer to as “banks” in this paper. We also employ the database of the
financial statements for the banks except insurance companies. This database is systematically
compiled and maintained by the “Japanese Banks Association” and is publicly available.
The numbers of banks and firms in the years 2000-2005 are reported in table 1.
year firms banks links
2000 2,629 211 27,389
2001 2,714 204 26,597
2002 2,739 202 24,555
2003 2,700 192 22,585
2004 2,701 190 21,919
2005 2,674 182 21,811
Table 1. Numbers of firms, banks and links in our dataset.
Typical numbers of banks are, for instance in the fiscal year of 2004, seven city banks (which
include the four majors: the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, theMizuho Bank, the Sumitomo-Mitsui
Bank and the UFJ Bank), 64 regional banks, 48 secondary regional banks and 9 trust banks;
the rest are long-term credit banks (which include two big banks: the Shinsei Bank and the
Aozora Bank) and insurance banks. As described previously, the Japanese financial institutions
experienced great damage in the national financial system after the Bubble crash in 1990, and
the merger of banks restructured it. The process is still going on: the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi
and the UFJ Bank have been merged into a single (and the largest) financial group. The merger
of banks is still going on since 2000 and can be emphasized by the decrease of the total number
of banks. This situation is common to all types of banks (see table 2). The other banks in
each year are mostly life and non-life insurance banks and a few government-affiliated financial
institutions.
On the other hand, firms are all listed in the Japanese markets, mostly consisting of large
firms. Industrial sectors are classified into 34 conventional sectors except banks and insurance,
divided into 17 manufacturing and 17 non-manufacturing sectors. The numbers of firms for
each sector in each year are summarized in the table 3.
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year 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
city 7 7 7 7 9 9
regional 64 64 64 64 64 64
2nd regional 48 50 53 57 57 60
trust 9 9 7 7 8 9
long-term 2 2 2 3 3 3
others 52 58 59 64 63 66
total 182 190 192 202 204 211
Table 2. Numbers of city, regional, secondary regional, trust, long-term banks in each year.
sector-classification 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
Foods 116 113 118 117 119 113
Textile Products 52 55 58 61 58 63
Pulp & Paper 21 23 23 24 28 30
Chemicals 151 154 158 160 162 159
Drugs 21 23 25 29 32 36
Petroleum 9 9 9 8 9 10
Rubber Products 21 23 23 25 22 22
Stone, Clay & Glass Products 63 62 66 68 70 72
Iron & Steel 47 47 50 54 53 54
Non-ferrous Metal & Metal Products 99 100 107 110 112 121
Machinery 191 196 200 205 207 204
Electric & Electronic Equip. 199 206 214 217 209 211
Shipbuilding & Repair 5 6 6 6 7 6
Motor Vehicles & Auto Parts 57 61 65 68 71 72
Transportation Equip. 12 13 13 17 17 18
Precision Equip. 45 47 45 46 45 43
Other Manufacturing 97 95 93 98 94 89
Fish & Marine Products 10 8 9 9 9 10
Mining 6 7 9 8 9 9
Construction 157 168 181 200 207 199
Wholesale Trade 295 299 304 322 317 304
Retail Trade 222 220 212 213 209 215
Securities houses 19 13 15 15 14 12
Credit & Leasing 73 69 56 51 52 49
Real Estate 100 93 84 79 71 57
Railroad Transportation 28 31 31 32 32 34
Trucking 35 35 32 31 28 30
Sea Transportation 19 19 19 19 20 21
Air Transportation 5 4 6 7 7 6
Warehousing & Harbor Transportation 39 38 36 35 37 34
Communication Services 29 26 19 17 23 17
Utilities(Electric) 9 9 8 8 8 7
Utilities(Gas) 12 12 13 11 11 11
Services 410 417 393 369 345 291
total 2,674 2,701 2,700 2,739 2,714 2,629
Table 3. Numbers of firms in our datasets for each sector in each year (17 manufacturing and 17 non-
manufacturing sectors).
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III. The network representation
We represent the system as a network, by using an approach based on the graph theory to
analyze the structure of credit relationships in the Japanese economic system. The network is
defined as a set of nodes and links and it is mathematically represented by a graph. In recent
years a large development of complex networks theory has been observed. Many real systems
have been represented as networks (Caldarelli, 2007; Dorogovtsev, 2003). Most of them show
scaling properties: they are scale-free networks, i.e. their degree distribution is power-law tailed.
In our case banks and firms represent the nodes, while the links represent the credit relationships
between them. This type of networks is particular, being composed by only two kinds of nodes,
and is called bipartite network. Figure 1 (a) represents an example of the bank-firm network.
Figure 1. (a) Illustration of a bank-firm bipartite network.(b) Projected network on banks. (c) Projected on
firms.
Many empirical studies have been conducted in the field of bipartite graphs (see e.g. Pel-
tomaki and Alava (2006); Sneppen et al. (2004); Guillaume and Latapy (2004)). One can extract
two networks from a bipartite network, each one composed by just one kind of nodes: these
two networks are called projected networks, since they are obtained as a projection of the initial
graph in the subspace composed by nodes of the same kind (see figure 1 (b) and (c)).
A network is represented from a mathematical point of view by an adjacency matrix. The
element of the adjacency matrix aij indicates that a link exists between nodes i and j; that is,
aij = 1 if the bank i provides a loan to the firm j; otherwise aij = 0. We can define a weighed
adjacency matrix wij where wij > 0 if the bank i provides a loan to the firm j and the value of
wij is exactly the size of the loan; otherwise wij = 0.
The degree of a node i is the number of its links and is calculated by
ki =
∑
j
ai,j . (1)
The neighbors of a node i is a set of nodes j such that aij = 1, which is denoted by V(i). The
strength of a node i is the total amounts of the weights of its links and is calculated by
si =
∑
j
wi,j . (2)
The participation ratio is a measure of the concentration of the weight of a node versus its
neighbors, and is defined by
Yi =
∑
j
(
wi,j
si
)2
. (3)
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In the case of identical links (full homogeneity), the participation ratio would be Yi = 1/ki. For
a main-bank system, we expect the contracts of debt of each firm to be concentrated, being
the contract with the main bank much more “important” with respect to those with the other
banks.
The assortativity is a measure of similarity among nodes and it is defined as
knn(i) =
1
ki
∑
j∈V(i)
kj . (4)
The distance dij between two nodes i, j is the shortest number of links to go from i to j.
Therefore the neighbors of a node i are all the nodes j which are connected to that node by a
single link (dij = 1). Using the adjacency matrix this can be written as
dij = min

 ∑
k,l∈Pij
akl

 , (5)
where Pij is a path connecting node i and node j. The diameter of a graph is given by the
maximum of all distances between pairs.
In the following we apply these tools to our dataset. It is mentioned that Fujiwara et al.
(2009) examined a similar dataset to quantify the dependency and influence between banks
and firms by using the weights defined above and assuming a diffusion process in the bipartite
graph. The present paper focuses on statistical properties of credit topology and weights, and
further on extraction of cohesive groups or communities in the network, and also an extensive
analysis of hierarchical structures.
IV. The Banks-Firms credit network
The average degree of firms is 〈kf 〉 = 8, while the average degree of banks is 〈kb〉 = 120; the
average strength of firms 〈sf 〉 = 2.15 × 10
4 million yen, while that of banks is 〈sb〉 = 3.6 × 10
5
million yen.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the degree for banks (left panel) and firms (right panel).
The maximum degree of the banks is 1,706, and that of the firms is 109, with very heterogeneous
behavior among banks and among firms. In particular, after having conditioned it for the firm’s
size, we found that many firms prefer single lending whereas others adopt a multiple lending
strategy.
In figure 3 (top panels), we show the scaling of the strength versus the degree. In the case
of banks the linear correlation coefficient between s and k is 0.8, while that for firms is 0.4.
This signals the presence of a weak link between the amount of credit firms demand the banks
for and the number of banks they ask to. The firms with large amount of borrowings prefer
multiple links (in agreement with Ogawa et al., 2007), but multi-lending is present also among
firms with a lower amount of borrowings. In figure 3 (bottom panel) we observe the scatter
plot for the degree of firms versus their total-debt. By calculating a rank correlation (Kendall’s
τ), we found that τ = 0.382 (27.0σ) (where σ is what is expected from the null hypothesis
that there is no association between the rank of degree and that of total-debt), which implies
significantly positive correlation.
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Figure 2. Degree cumulative distribution of banks (left panel) and firms (right panel). The cumulative distribu-
tion has a power-law tail, P>(k) ∝ k−µ in both cases. For banks µ = 0.9±0.1, for firms the estimated parameter
is µ = 2.6 ± 0.1. The estimation of the exponent is done by maximum likelihood method (Hill’s estimate) here
and hereafter.
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Figure 3. Top panels: strength s vs. degree k of banks (left panel) and firms (right panel), considering total
contracts. Bottom panel: scatter plot for degree (firms) and total-debt.
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In figure 4, the distribution of the strength for total contracts is plotted. The maximum
strength of banks is 6.5 × 106 million yen and 1.5 × 106 for firms, and there is no difference in
the plots when long-term and short-term loans are considered.
Once one looks into the differentiation of the lending contracts for all the firms, a fat tail
distribution of the amount of the contracts emerges (figure 5, left panel). This heterogeneity is
not a consequence of the heterogeneity of firms’ sizes. In fact, after normalization, we can still
observe a fat-tailed distribution in the right panel of figure 5.
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Figure 4. Strength cumulative distribution of banks (left) and firms (right), considering total contracts. The
best fit, in the intermediate range of values, is P>(s) ∝ s−µ in both cases. For firms the estimated parameter is
µ = 0.86± 0.03, for banks µ = 0.51± 0.05.
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Figure 5. Comparison of weights distributions (left panel) with the distribution of weights renormalized by the
capital size (right panel). The best fit is P>(w) ∝ w−µ. In the left plot estimated parameter is µ = 0.95± 0.01,
in the right one µ = 2.38 ± 0.08.
Which is the differentiation inside the set of contracts of firm by firm? The participation
ratio is a measure of the heterogeneity of the amount of debt of a certain firm versus its creditors,
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Figure 6. Participation ratio Y of firms vs. 1/k.
i.e. if the sizes of different loans are roughly of a similar size or not. The ratio for a firm f is
Yf =
∑
b
(
wf,b
sf
)2
. (6)
In figure 6, the actual participation ratio is represented with black dots, while the red line
represents the “homogeneous” case Yf = 1/kf . As expected, the dots do not overlap with
the homogeneous line. Let us note that heterogeneity is stronger in the case of weak multiple
lending (low k, right side of the x axis).
No striking differences in the distributions of firms-degree are observed when one considers
separately long- and short-term contracts: the average degree k is 6.7 (for the long-term loan)
and 5.7 (short-term), while the maximum k is 108 (long-term) and 54 (short-term). The linear
correlation coefficient between the degree and the total amount of borrowings for firms is 0.19
(short term) and 0.39 (long term), while they increase quite a lot for banks to 0.79 (short
term) and 0.88 (long term) respectively. It looks as if there is (no) statistically robust link
between long- (short-) term contracts and multi-lending, because limited information induces
risk diversification.
If one analyzes the percentage of short-term or long-term contracts with respect to the total
amount of borrowings versus degree k (as plotted in figure 7), a decreasing tendency of the ratio
short/long can be emphasized.
V. Hierarchical clustering of co-financing banks
From the network of banks and firms, we can extract the network of the co-financing banks with
the method of projected network (De Masi and Gallegati, 2007). The obtained bank network
is defined as a weighted network, only populated by banks, in which two banks are linked if
they finance the same firm; therefore, the weight w of the link is the number of firms they both
finance. The banks are divided in 6 subgroups depending on the kind of bank, as shown in
table 4.
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Figure 7. Relative long (left) and short (right) term strength vs. degree of firms. Firms with high degree
subscribe long-term contracts.
large sector color description
1 black long-term credit bank
2 blue city banks
3 green regional banks
4 yellow trust banks
5 orange secondary regional banks
6 white the rest of banks
Table 4. Classification of banks
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Instead of considering the whole weighted adjacency matrix W and the whole network, we
analyze a tree with only N−1 links, which select the most of important links of the matrix wi,j .
The algorithm used to construct the tree of banks is the Minimal Spanning Tree (MST) (e.g.
Cormen et al. (2001)) (see Mantegna (1999) for an early application in financial market). We
consider a set of N banks and the weighted matrix wi,j of the number of contracts in common
among them. We define a distance between a pair of banks
di,j = 1− w˜i,j , (7)
where w˜i,j = wi,j/wmax, and wmax is the maximum among all the weights of the links. Then
the MST is calculated in the following way:
• rank by increasing order the N(N − 1)/2 values of di,j
• pick the pair corresponding to the smallest di,j and create a link between these two banks
• pick the pair corresponding to the second higher di,j and create a link between these two
banks
• repeat the operation unless adding a link between the pair under consideration creates a
cycle, in which case skip that value of di,j .
In this way we find a tree containing the strongest links of the original weighted matrix wi,j.
In figure 8, we plot the MST. This is the backbone of co-financing relationships in Japan.
In the year 2004, the hubs are Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (center), the Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd (bottom) and UFJ Bank, Ltd. (top). The three hubs structure allows
separating the bank system in three sub-graphs: the failure of one of the three largest banks
can cause a huge impact in each corresponding subsystem that is divided by the clusters. We
observe clusters with strong geographical characterization: the nodes’ neighbors in the tree are
in the same geographical region. We have clear hierarchical clustering, where the hubs are
Tokyo Mitsubishi, Sumitomo Mitsui and UFJ bank. These three hubs, Tokyo-Mitsubishi, UFJ
and Sumitomo Mitsui, are the largest banks in Japan until the year 2006, when the former two
banks were merged into a single and largest bank. We may recognize branches from the Chubu
region, pairs of banks from Tohoku, Chubu, Kantou, Kyushu, triads from Chugoku, Okinawa;
also some pairs of institutes of life insurance.
We can observe a very clear geographical location of the clusters. We may define the color
of the nodes considering their region (table 5).
The MST obtained with this definition of colors is represented in figure 9.
A look at the MST reveals that several of its portions can be well understood. We can
interpret the tree by making some considerations:
• The main reason why banks and financial institutions have borrowers in common is that
they do the lending activity in the same geographical regions. In particular, very fre-
quently, regional banks have common sets of borrowers in the same regional places. This
is because Japanese firms have customarily borrowed from more than one bank. This is
in contrast with the US, where many small and medium-size firms have single borrowings.
Moreover, traditionally major banks operate mainly in the urban regions of Tokyo, Osaka
and Nagoya, so their common borrowers are quite similar. On the other hand, in recent
13
Figure 8. Minimal Spanning tree for year 2004 with 178 banks: the colors indicate the kind of bank.
group color region
0 white not regional
1 black Hokkaido and Tohoku
2 blue Kantou
3 green Chubu
4 yellow Kinki
5 orange Chugoku
6 red Shikoku
7 brown Kyushu
Table 5. Geographical classification of banks.
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Figure 9. Minimal Spanning tree for year 2004 with 178 banks: the colors indicate the geographical locations.
years, major banks have increased the number of branch offices in suburban areas, so they
have begun to share common borrowers with regional banks.
• The set of common borrowers is also explained considering that in Japan the lending
activity is based on keiretsu, between major and regional banks, between banks and trust-
banks, and between banks and insurance companies (life-, fire- and marine-insurances).
Frequently, big firms in industrial business conglomerates (groups partly remnant from the
pre-war zaibatsu) have borrowed from closely related conglomerates of financial businesses
of banks, trust-banks and insurance companies.
• Two other reasons may determine what has been observed. The first one is that when
foreign-affiliated (-owned) insurance companies lend to individuals (these activities are
extended to lending to firms as well), they are supported by branch offices of regional
banks. The second one is that keiretsu exists between major banks and regional banks.
In the same keiretsu, human resources, financial technologies and operating systems are
shared. This can possibly yield opportunities for sharing common borrowers. In the MST
different main branches of the tree correspond to the keiretsu between major and regional
banks.
• Banks had been customarily owners of firms’ equities in correlation with shares of lend-
ing to those firms. In other words, lending relationships are associated with particular
ownership relations. This activity would result in common lending followed by common
shareholding.
• Finally, firms happen to be in the same syndicated loan. This is a large loan in which a
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group of banks work together to provide funds for a borrower. There is usually one leading
bank, which is called arranger and is often a major bank, which takes a percentage of the
loan and syndicates the rest to other banks.
VI. Co-financed firms network
We can project the bipartite network in the subspace of firms, obtaining the co-financed firms’
network. This strongly connected network was created in 2004 by 2,661 firms, linked to each
other by almost 3 millions (2,881,763) links (as the number of possible links is 3,539,130 this
is more than 80% of all existing possible links among firms). The average connectivity is
k = 2, 164. If the lending was sectorial (i.e. certain banks finance certain firms (for example
firms of the same industrial sector), while other banks finance other firms, this would imply, in
the projected space, the formation of grouping of cofinanced firms (properly said communities
in the network literature). On the contrary, in the empirical case, we observe that each firm is
connected to many other ones and that there are not communities. This is a sign of the fact
that the lending is not sectorial.
We aggregate several sectors of table 3 into six groups: 1) Foods, Chemicals, Drugs; 2) Iron,
Steel, Non-ferrous Metals, Metal Products; 3) Motor Vehicles, Auto Parts, Transportation
Equip., Shipbuilding, Repair; 4) Machinery, Electric and Electronic Equip., Precision Equip.,
other Manufacturing; 5) the rest of manufacturing sectors, and 6) all of non-manufacturing
sectors.
In the following we extract the sub-networks of firms belonging to the same group. We
calculated the MST for each sector. The trees obtained are reported in figure 10. For each tree,
the hubs are indicated in the caption of the figure.
Investigating the clusters, one may observe a regular pattern, except for the first group of
sectors (Foods, Chemical and Drugs, panel top left): there exists a very big firm as a hub, which
has many connected firms and from 2 to 5 large firms. In turn, these firms create sub-hubs,
i.e. they are connected to other smaller firms constituting an autonomous tree. Note that
asymmetric information may be the cause of such a configuration. On the one hand, in fact,
banks tend to specialize in providing credit to some sectors only (they diversify the risk by
investing in different industrial sectors); but also there is a geographical specialization, which
leads to the birth of the sub-hubs.
VII. Financial status and topology
This section investigates the effect of the financial status of the firms on the topology structure
as well as of banks. Data show that debt, asset and DAR (debt on asset ratio) are correlated
with the total degree of the firm, although not very strongly. This signals the presence of strong
heterogeneity among firms with similar degrees.
In order to test the statistical significance of the correlation values, we compute the proba-
bility p of obtaining a correlation as large as the observed value by random chance, when the
true correlation is zero. If p is small, say less than 0.05, then the correlation is significant.
The p-value is computed by transforming the correlation to create a t-statistic having N − 2
degrees of freedom, where N is the number of rows of X. In the following table 6 we observe
the correlation values among degree, debt, asset and DOA.
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Figure 10. MST of firms sector by sector.
variable 1 variable 2 correlation p
debt degree 0.32 < 0.001
asset degree 0.29 < 0.001
DAR degree 0.24 < 0.001
debt asset 0.97 < 0.001
Table 6. Correlation among degree, debt, asset and DOA.
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The debt and the size (asset) of the firm are highly correlated, as pointed out in a previous
work by Fujiwara (2004). The distributions of asset, debt and debt on capital of our sample are
plotted in the figure 11 and figure 12. The firms are divided in 5 classes based on the different
asset value. The classes are built with the aim to obtain 5 equally populated classes.
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Figure 11. Asset A = K−D and debt D cumulative distributions for the year 2004. The best fit is P>(x) ∝ x−µ
in both cases. In the left plot the estimated parameter is µ = 0.82 ± 0.03, in the right one µ = 0.74 ± 0.02.
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Figure 12. Debt on capital distribution for the year 2004. The distribution of liabilities is power law distributed
as observed by (Fujiwara, 2004).
In figure 13, we plot the degree distributions for firms belonging to each of the 5 classes.
Firms’ behavior of the same classes is very heterogeneous: the number of contracts in each class
is variable, even if the value of P (k) shifts toward higher values of k, when the size of the firms
increase: multi-lending is present in both small and large firms, even if the bigger firms have a
larger number of creditors.
In addition, we checked the widely recognized hypothesis that the balance-sheet conditions of
financial institutions also affect the bank-firm relationships. We examined the relation between
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Figure 13. P (k) distribution for the year 2004: blue dot are the smallest firms and, increasing their asset value,
we define the colors green, yellow, magenta, red.
Figure 14. Scatter plot for the capital-to-asset rations and the degrees of banks. Filled dots are the regional
and 2nd regional banks, while circles are city banks. The linear regression for the ratio and the log of degree is
shown by a solid line, where the city banks are not included in the regression analysis.
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the capital-to-asset ratio of banks and their degrees. Figure 14 shows the scatter plot of the
capital-to-asset ratios and degrees for the regional banks (filled dots) and also for the city
banks (circles). The latter group obviously has a different distribution, so we focused only on
the regional banks and confirmed that there exists a weakly positive correlation, R = 23.4%
(p-value < 10−2).
VIII. Conclusive Remarks
In this conclusive section, we would like to emphasize how a new tool for economic policy
emerges from the network analysis, namely the issues of stabilization of the financial system by
preventing a financial crises, with its propagation and amplification, or domino effects. Real
economies are composed by millions of interacting agents, whose distribution is far from being
stochastic or normal. The Japanese credit market shows that several hubs exist, i.e. banks
and firms with many connections: the distribution of the degree of connectivity is scale-free,
i.e. there are a lot of firms with 1 or 2 links, and very few firms with a lot of connections well
described by a scale-free distribution. Let us assume the Central Authority has to prevent a
financial collapse of the system, or the spreading of it (the so-called domino effect). Rather
than looking at the “average” risk of bankruptcy, and to infer it would represent the stability
of the system, the network analysis of the real system tells us to investigate the different sub-
systems of the global economy and to intervene to prevent failures and their spread. Instead of
a helicopter drop of liquidity, one can make “targeted” interventions to a given agent or sector
of activity: Fujiwara (2008) shows how to calculate the probability of going bankrupt by solo,
i.e. because of idiosyncratic elements, or domino effect , i.e. because of failure or other agents
having credit or commercial links.
In this paper we performed a first analysis of relationships of credit between Japanese quoted
firms and banks. We focus on the problem of multiple relationships in Japan, in order to study
how the typical Japanese financial conglomerates (the keiretsu) influence the network topology
of the underlying architecture of credit relationships. Notwithstanding the behavior of firms
and banks is highly heterogeneous, one may observe that firms with a large demand for credit
have multiple links (in agreement with Ogawa et al., 2007), because of risk sharing on the part
of the banks. The analysis of the MST (minimum spanning tree) of the co-financing banks
points out the presence of a hierarchical structure of the channels of credit, with big hubs (the
largest Japanese banks) and several branches (smaller banks). These branches have a strong
geographical characterization, indicating the presence of regional clusters in the system of the
Japanese credit market (the presence of geographical clusters is also evident as regards the
Italian market: De Masi and Gallegati, 2007).
To conclude, we point out that: (i) a backbone of the credit channel emerges, where some
links play a crucial role; (ii) big banks privilege long-term contracts; the “minimum spanning
trees” (iii) disclose a highly hierarchical backbone, where the central positions are occupied
by the largest banks, and emphasize (iv) a strong geographical characterization, while (v) the
clusters of firms do not have specific common properties. Moreover, (vi) while larger firms have
multiple lending in large, (vii) the demand for credit (long vs. short term debt and multi-credit
lines) of firms with similar sizes is very heterogeneous.
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